be sure to watch c-span's "washington journal" live at 7:00 eastern this morning. join the discussion. a former ambassador to libya was among several policy official who is briefed members of the senate foreign relations committee about the ongoing civil conflict in leadership libya and what role allies could take to try and stop the fighting. from capitol hill, this is a little over an hour and a half. >> i'm going to go ahead and start. the foreign relations committee

will come to order. we thank all of those for being here. in today's hearing, we'll examine the crisis in libya. i would like to thank our witnesses for being on the committee for this important issue. libya remains on the brink of civil war. like many of its neighbors, they failed to transition into a table representative democracy following arab spring. sadly, the libyan people have paid the price. fighting militias has weakened government institutions and weak tight end economy and is posing a substantial risk to the u.s. and our allies. fighting that provided an environment for terrorist groups like isis. we've had some successes but the conditions allowing extremists to thrive remain.

i think many of us agree that the libyan political agreement needs to be altered as the current government lacks the ability to govern the entire country but that is only the beginning. until they come under some type of central political control, no government will be able to provide essential services across the country. even then, the will face enormous challenges to fix weak government institutions. i work for a -- i look forward on whatiscussion today needs to be done to bring about a peaceful resolution. we are interested to hear to refuse and the u.s. can do to help achieve these goals. with that, and what we should expect if isis or radical groups regained ground in libya. and both for being here. toassador, i didn't want to have to hear all of my opening

statement so i went ahead and begin. >> thank you. i thought your opening statement was important to be heard by all. i think you for convening the libya. on yesterday, i have the opportunity to represent the committee along with senator who represented the appropriations committee. we met with the ambassadors to the united nations security council. happy to our discussion. it was a helpful discussion. we had -- we talked about a whole range of issues from north doing annikki haley is excellent job. i think her representation will be important this month. she spoke on issues of before him, she is focusing on issues of north korea and other areas that the united states has national security interest.

one of the things that came up during that discussion by our hernds in europe and tell in africa and the middle east is , what will be america's engagement? will america be a power for the values that we stand for in dealing with global challenges? and that was raised by both friends in europe and in the middle east and africa. -- in the say the that because the united states must be engaged. it is in our national security -- that represent all of the population. because we don't have a representative government, what happens is it creates a void. isis.e void is filled by as we have seen in northern

africa. it is filled by russia. as we see russia's engagement in libya which is not helpful. and we recognize that it is in america's national security interest to get engaged. we have a private panel of trumpses that the administration has yet to be able to fill in critical positions and we are not clear what his policies are in regards to libya. in theisappointed meeting with the prime minister of italy at trump said -- i am paraphrasing -- but he said we don't have a role in the you. i think we do have a role of the you. is an important indication by congress that we expect able to be played. i want to underscore the importance of a representative and inclusive government. there is no military solution that we have seen -- there is no

toitary solution to the -- libya. we need an inclusive government that represents all the different factions. gna, wee leadership of were able to make progress but we also see with moscow's involvement, putin's involvement , in the eastern part of libya is causing problems for civilian control of the country and is participating in activities that, in my mind, raise concern about human rights violations -- war crimes. if it is done right, we could have a representative government to benefit the people of libya and give them a growing economy and standard of living. that is our goal. and i think this hearing could

play an important part in the senate oversight of that responsibility. i look forward to hearing from our witnesses. >> we now turn to our witnesses. the first one is the senior fellow at the cloak endowment for international peace. thank you for being here. our second witnesses the honorable deborah jones. the u.s. ambassador to libya from 2013-2015. if you would give your opening comments in the order that i introduced you, if you could summarize. please proceed. thank you. chairman corker, ranking members, i'm grateful for this opportunity to speak with you about libya's political crisis and the way forward for u.s. policy. i'm also honored to be joined by my distinguished co-panelist.

the unraveling has been harrowing to watch. government in tripoli is failing. unable to establish itself against feuding militias. the council conference and existential challenge from a the egyptcked by united ever records and increasingly, russia. the parliament in the east has refused to endorse the parliamentary counsel with the object being the issue of control over libya's military. meanwhile, the country slides towards economic ruin. the surge of immigrants remain unchecked and with her in the form of islamic state, al qaeda, or a new mutation could take root. at the most basic level, the united states faces two imperatives. ofst, preventing insurgents

terrorist activity and supporting the formation of an inclusive, representative stable government. a libyan garrett -- a libyan ed campaign -- low hundreds, pooling in the center west and south and a try to mount a high visibility attack to show their continued viability. what struck me most during my visits last year to the libyan is that any traction the islamic state got was often highly transactional. it was the result of poor government. and this leads to the approach of denying islamic state strategy. promoting invisible governments, education, civil society -- it forms a vital adjunct to the counterterrorism tools. assist libya,o

the united states must proceed carefully. a particularto armed group could upset the balance of power and cause greater factional conflict. moving forward, the united states should only back the forces recognized by the government, and even this should be limited in scope and geared towards a specific threat. where we are crucial is in the formation of a new government. the starting point is a libyan ed government. thedozen 16, specifically corporation of the presidency council. the new talk should focus on two tracks absent in the first agreement. it should include the leaders of libya's armed groups who must agree on a roadmap to build a national military structure.

must an american redline continue to be the elected civilian control over the military. proposals for military rule are hardly a recipe for ensuring stability. for most libyans, that runs counter to what they fought for in the revolution. second, a setup for the transparent resolution of oil resolution. one such agreement is in place -- once an agreement is in place, the united states and its allies must be ready to support whatever government emerges. with the formal institutions gutted by years of dictatorial, citizens remain the greatest resource. this is why it is important that the united states reserve the capacity to engage directly with the libyan people. across libya have underscored the desperation of its plate. yes, the islamic state was told a significant blow, thanks in

large measure to the sacrifices of great libyans. but libyans are no more are now more polarized than ever. now is the time for american leadership to avert an impending collapse, safeguard american interests and to help the country recognize the promise of its revolution. think you for the opportunity to speak. >> distinguished members of the committee, as a retiree, i have never dealt with the parking downtown coming in from mclean on a tuesday morning. it is my distinct honor to appear before you today. i am pleased to appear with a colleague that i consider a real authority and one of the most honest voices on libya that i hear. libya is confounded and frustrated, the stubborn

resistance to the obvious th of oil and civilians. wouldssume that libya, turn into to the height the mediterranean and that we could go away. in hindsight, that was clearly wishful thinking because libya .as not the landscape it has a history like any other place and it is one of fragmentation even proceeding qadhafi. what i often say to people is that it off he was not the creator of libya's fragmentation. he exploited by using the oil alth. he deposed the king without firing a shot. when he came in. he used the oil wells as a cartel would do to extort and bribe. to bring to power in disparate

parts of the country. it has three separate entities. they each have different backgrounds which explained to us often the different influences in t plays to regional partners. died, libya was a mafia without a don. understanding the spectrum is important to comprehending the deep divide and political antagonisms that followed the revolution, which i concluded not long after my arrival in tripoli in 2013 -- it was unfinished. parliamentary -- in 2012, that is the equivalent of purchasing a nib for a fountain pen that didn't exist.

there remains no effective government behind that. i have submitted a rather lengthy techcrunch note which we hope people will read because it does contain a bit of a different narrative. many people have described the lines of the splits in libya. i suspect that the doctor would agree that to view this in status quo, some who are pro-gadhafi versus democratic revolutionary people, with extreme it's on both sides. this reveals a significant amount of people who were educated in the united states and elsewhere. some unabashed ideologues, a number of opportunistic bedfellows. which often blurred extinction. i won't go into the hold iterative of the talks there but

i would agree with fred. it, as we looked over observed on the ground and we worked to advance our mutual interest, it became clear to us that when we worked in areas oft gave the appearance giving advantage to either military side, we were able to accomplish things. on the other hand, training elite special forces that led to the 2013 appeal to build a general purpose force were frustrated due to the competition and fracture in the lack of any unified command and control system. throughout the qadhafi era, technocrats who were instructed with the central bank, oil company and investment company were left alone to do their business. indicating to me that libyans did not want to disturb their national wealth.

and we found as we worked closely behind the scenes with the currently insured at her made the case. , there haver years been efforts by some to create competing authorities. to the dismay of the average libyan whose primary concern is that they have enough to eat, communicate and travel. against this background, tripoli's political disarray, which was significant -- benghazi continues to face assassinations and lawlessness is the government removed itself from benghazi with the international committee. and this is where -- first appeared in february. 2014 at the time of the dissolution of the gnc.

calls on libyans to rise up and join him against the illegal, .nlawful gnc he didn't start much response. he would back underground to only reappear in may, when he declared his vigilante war against individuals he fortituted responsible benghazi's en anarchy. you know the story of the national elections in 2014. i hope you will read carefully because myh on that understanding as i was on the ground was different in response to counter threats. and the declaration of the people on the brick side at the dialogue was no longer necessary. the militias acted preemptively and encircled to drive militias

meant tripoli which taking them out of areas they had conquered during the revolution. this was about revolutionary ooty -- holding on to the airport, the islamic call center which was important under gadhafi and was important in .erms o led to ourt withdrawal and the eventual withdrawal of all eventual diplomatic members and institutions and missions in libya at the time. i won't get into the boycott but i will offer a couple of things. describes thed strife in political disarray.

the united states did conduct a number of missions successfully captures.e while engaging credibly with all sides in the political reconciliation talks and with his support of the libyan government. this isn't a matter that requires us to pick and choose. libyans were the first to seek u.s. assistance in removing them. it were the first to draw our attention to the growing isis with the historical tribe that had facilitated for opportunistic reasons with another terrorist group. we can talk about isil later but i think you have covered the roadmap there. in conclusion, and we can get into questions later, that libya is not engaged in a traditional civil war. this is a war aimed at controlling and not destroying critical infrastructure and the

acting of a trusted administrator in sovereign wealth. her test privity prime motivators of arriving at solutions but as long as different factions, who have been evenly matched in terms of holding their turf, believe it can continue to count on external support to tip the scales and reached the limits of hurt or exhaustion, warfare will continue which contributes to human suffering, penetration of libya's territory i foreign daesh.s i al qaeda and ors is not good for libya partners. but it will require a buy-in at the lowest levels for a regime that ensures the distribution of wealth, a certain degree of autonomy as local and regional levels, and the reintegration of militias and their members.

it must be inclusive and a love .or their return of all libyans it must begin with a cease-fire. monitored by the international community with libyan acquiescence and support, with the covering of heavy weapons through the country and continued cooperation against isis and others who wish to exploit libyan territory. the libyans must agree to all of this. >> if you could come to a conclusion? >> i will conclude. libya is not easy but it is a worthwhile project. there is no alternative. legitimacy must be earned. libyans have not asked us to fight their battles for them. the least we can do is support their dreams which were inspired by our example. >> senator cardin? >> let me think both of our witnesses.

there are clearly great differences between syria and libya. has ethnic clashes that are deep and historic warehouse libya doesn't affect burden. but we saw where russia intervened in syria and the damage is caused by putin's engagement in syria, making it extremely difficult to get all sides together in a peace process, which is the ultimate answer in syria and libya. so now we see disturbing trends about russia's engagement in libya. activelyere they are engaged in supporting general have tour. difficulten extremely in recognizing a civilian government and, according to human rights watches has committed war crimes.

question first would be, what is russia's intentions in libya. why have they been able to get the cooperation of egypt, one of our partners in allowing the use inegypt's facilities military operations in libya. ? interest inthe u.s. dealing with russia's engagement in libya? do you have suggestions here? to try to help me understand the roadmap? of libya's saving grace is that it is not syria. the level of international interference pales in comparison to syria. the regional interference is not simply russia. i would point to the goal states as the most harmful actors and a

lot of the stems back to the revolution where we had to go states playing out the regional rivalry on libyan soil. the egyptian role came before russia. they have had long-standing economic and security interest in libya. they were among the first backers of the operation dignity in 2014. and when general cc took power, it was felt in libya. policies did shift. in your testimony, you say the respect for civilian controls is critical to the civility of that country? the general has not been helpful in that regard. >> correct. >> russia seems to be siding with the general? >> exactly. enter russia. russia's interest in libya stems back to the qaddafi era.

they have a norm contract with infrastructure projects. but the general is a useful ally to them. they sensed the vacuum. it is useful for their narrative. nato broke the country and here comes pressure to clear it up. they are backing him with spare parts and training and medical care. a printed currency for the eastern government and that is one of the alarming things about the parallel institutions. unrecognized faction has its own central bank and russia was printing currency to help profit it up. so their role has been unhelpful. it has been theatrical at times. bringing the general to the aircraft carrier was the optical. the question is, can they pull a syria in libya? two they want to present themselves as the indispensable broker? do they want to be the ones who

forge a new government that is favorable to their stagy -- two extra digit and economic interests. if the united states -- >> if the united states withdrew support would it create greater power for russia? >> i think so, yes. everyone is on edge, waiting for the u.s. to give a signal. the absence of a signal creates a freeze and a vacuum which is an invitation for other powers. >> what type of signal are they waiting for? high visibility signals about our diplomatic engagement and our support for the government. the role of special envoys from state department of supporting the europeans. i think just a more physical and vocal signal. certainly not a signal that we of thehing our hands country. >> if i could, a signal?

sorry, i heard your two points with staff yesterday talking about that and i realized it was helpful in what happened with isis. but i'm not understanding what that really means relative to our leadership there. and why -- i am truly seeking an answer. i know that italy and france and other countries are really involved. tell me what it is specifically that the united states should do to move towards a political agreement? reporter: again -- again, support: to the regional initiatives. statements. convening new negotiating track in tandem with these regional partners.

to the libyan people and libyan political actors that we are prepared to engage along a broad spectrum of initiatives to help libyan society and to help the libyan government. one bright spot of what i am talking about was when the libyan factions moved there fighting to the seventh. south. the p5 issued a statement saying it is bad for libya. that is the kind of consensus where the u.s. needs to play a leading role and not a background role. >> the two think the witnesses. -- we want to thank the witnesses. i see libyan technocrats -- do they still exist? is there still hope of providing the libyan technocrats? i asked the ambassador.

to the oilcomes company and the bank, there are technocrats but the political leadership is in disarray. we were able to do that when we were engaged. had engagement in libya since 2014 which sends a huge message to the libyans. and unfortunately, for political sensitivities and the rest, the u.s. was hesitant to withdraw -- worried about the process it may cause at home that we brought the russians and the chinese into the dialogue process. actively engaged in. and having the u.s. on board a solutionsupports

is important. on a practical note, the general 12%never controls more than of the country at any given point in time. he will never defeat basis unless you have cooperation across the board if you go into supporting haftar, it will turn into civil war. >> how many significant groups are competing? i would say there are thousands. libya ise tragedies in that it is so fragmented. within tripoli there are four or five. >> are there major ones? are there 10 major groups? dr. wehrey: it really is that

fragmented. whoe is talk now about -- you couldmain probably get 12-15 leaders of the armed groups and that would get you there. but the chance for spoilers to play a role is high. >> what role is diplomacy? you have to start with military control, correct? somebody has to control the ground, militarily? someone has to bring the factions together? dr. wehrey: in certain areas, the factions are tied to towns. east in benghazi. so there is a measure of control. it is negotiated control between businessmen and counsel. so the notion that you have one is fanciful.

we need to look at growing this from the ground up. >> who will be the counteracting force to haftar? who would be the most trusted foreign power to insert stability control? for example, wasn't italy the prior trading partner? dr. wehrey: italy is playing a usual in brokering a dialogue. they have offered help to the east. >> what kind of presence does italy have now? does any foreign power have troops? dr. wehrey: there are soldiers at a hospital in miss rodda and there are troops in tripoli doing low-level training. >> just help and advice. do they need more? should we be encouraging

european allies to step up to plate? someone has to insert military power to gain control? dr. wehrey: i don't think so. this is something that needs to be greed off on, a simulation force under the human or a you put any super depth of the libyans. u.n. or the eu under the support of the libyans. disarray.n political and there are thousands of militias. i'm trying to come up with what will really -- it will require some kind of international coalition invited by the libyans to stabilize the situation, correct? dr. wehrey: i don't think so, no. there are talks underway, including a security track to

get the armed group actors on board for organization for structure and leadership and for who gets to stay in the military and who leaves. a lot of the young men want to go back to school and jobs. >> thank you. >> and the libyans are asking for that? dr. wehrey: they are. ftar?cluding ha deborah jones: no. dr. wehrey: he is talking about the structure but he wants to be a part of the council and he wants to create a supreme counselor. >> it is kind of a problem? deborah jones: it is a problem. thereality is that dispersal of heavy weapons and opposition to him is so deep. and they do have the capability as we saw in july and august of

2014, they do have the command and control and the sense of protecting their own turf that will drive them to combat this. haftar is in the lead. haftar pas restated opposition bringsg supported discomfort to people. particularly given his ties supporters outside the you. where people don't know what the point is. all countries in the security council were in agreement that we wanted a stable libya but there are other factors here. we do have friends and partners, including egypt, who are adequately opposed to the notion that any islamist group have any ,ccess to libya past wealth

which they believe will take provide competition for their own government. and therefore, their objective to keep them away and for them. been a tool everybody recognizes that he has been unable to consolidate his games outside of benghazi. and it has been going on for three years. i agree with fred completely. unless you have a living agreement on an organization that will ensure transparent distribution of wealth under a theylocalized government, are not going to accept anything else and they do not want foreign troops on the ground. this is a country that was devastated between world war ii. >> i got it. booker: you write in

your testimony, i want to read a portion of it. "of the society is an adjunct to traditional counterterrorism tools like surveillance and reconnaissance, border control, training and equipment and direct action." you describe an environment where isis is thriving in areas where isis is taking advantage of the vacuum. i want to put that in the context of administration policy right now in inducing state department resources to build civil societies. sort ofocking to me a budget they have outlined in inght of what you are indicate is the policy to bring stability back to libya. dr. wehrey: where isis stood up

camp, it was areas that fell off the map. you look at gaddafi's hometown, it was brutalized and neglected after the revolution. it was lacking services and governing and representation. there were tribes who welcomed the islamic state for protection. the same thing in the west. doing dealslers because there was no economy. same thing in benghazi. fortify theu resilience of libyan society to jihadist penetration? that is where civil society comes in. senator booker: so that is critical? of usf that is essential doing the civil society investment and the state

department is critically able to do? dr. wehrey: i think so. and us along with local partners -- i went to southern libya to a remote town that was wracked by tribal fighting. it has fallen off the. aboutpeople there talked a computer center that was set up that connected them to the globe that gave them computer signals. unfortunately, the center was destroyed in fighting. but they look at that as commitment. >> another thing that disturbs me is that we seem to be operating under the amf from 2001. i'm curious as to whether our intervention militarily -- and i hope to see more civil society work -- do you think they want

to continue to use that as a justification for their intervention? i open that up to either one of you? sayrah jones: i can't i am noi am not -- longer in the government. contacts onng from the special forces side that they are hearing signals that we are essentially going to go to a hit and run policy in libya as opposed to get together the kind of injuring solution. >> if i could -- what you are saying is that it will be an whack-a-molec blac effort? you don't hear any plans of long-term ground? and you are saying it is unnecessary anyway?

i hear nothing to that end. deborah jones: i am hearing tactical inpatients. people want to act against what , not considering the libyan context. libyans don't have indigenous isis, by and large. it is opportunistic and they don't want to share their wealth. they have been the ones to call isil out in their own country. that is problematic to me on a number of levels. --ant to jump really quick human trafficking is a serious concern in the country. iowa reported that migrants ,re being held hostage in libya --fficking and smuggling driving the conflict there. i want to know if you have any what we should do to

address this crisis. i imagine quelling the conflict allowed this to delivery. which it we be doing? doing? should we be deborah jones: i'm sorry to say that human trafficking, piracy -- it has been part and parcel of libyans history. even when you had a strong government. hehas been something that paid the kind of attention that the international community would like them to pay. this is an area where you have a political dialogue and a government that engages across the country, and makes the distribution of wealth part and parcel of working against those kinds of things, and replacing those kinds of things -- -- in the south and those on the borders. who have brought in sub-saharan

africans and treated them. this is precisely the kind of thing that you can only address with civil society and governance. to add to that, it is a symptom of libya's economic collapse that the circle of complicity in the smuggling trade has widened. in the south, that is a people make their living. the same thing in the north. promoting programs for alternative livelihood in the south -- fixing libya's economic crisis. but being careful of who we partner with. the notion of training philippian coast guard -- who are we talking about? many are militia run. to theng the migrants detention centers -- i have seen several of them, it is inhumane and immoral. >> thank you. thank you so much for your

testimony here today. i want to highlight the importance of the united states working on multiple fronts to defeat isis in libya. you have spoken some to this. on april 20, trump held a press conference with italian foreign minister and he said he doesn't see able for the united states -- he doesn't see a role for the united states in libya. defeat isise that in libya or any were also will require the establishment of inclusive and effective governance? not just ct strikes? dr. wehrey: i do agree, 100%. testimony,ed in my who joins isis? losers in the political order,

people shutout of the political order. -- government that includes that excludes people, they are going to get radicalized and increase the pool of terrorism. >> and that has ramifications for our needs to invest in a usaid state department and the civil society that could help their are some of the challenges of the region and the municipal administration that you spoke to? dr. wehrey: absolutely. one of the bright spots in libya is the fact that municipal authorities in toy collected legitimacy. there are certain cases where they have had success. with the united nations and toers is going straight them. what is so worried -- what is a worrying about the areas under

haftar is that he has replaced them with military governors. deborah jones: i would only say we saw support- and had opportunistic nothing ideologically to do with. it was about a competition for resources. so until you have a government that does what a government is supposed to do, through security quickly toward framework law, he will have this problem in libya. >> my previous line of questioning was prospective. the retrospective, let's think about the lessons learned. about whether there are broader applications to the middle east. you know that many thought a on the mediterranean would emerge after the overthrow of

gaddafi, and it was wishful thinking. we have a questions we should consider. was whether the consequences of our action has been fully considered. there was a failure to ask the question in what was done next and what broader lessons for u.s. policy in the middle east based on the experiences in libya may redraw? think thates: i do it was a different situation. theink people forget it was arab league that came to us and asked us to take action to provide a no-fly zone because it off the, unlike leaders in tunisia and egypt and yemen, resolutions were

in place, they were not attacking their own regions. but qaddafi was threatening to do so. when you have a situation like that, i think politically it would have been difficult for us to stand by and do nothing and who we haveator dealt with as a dictator to stand by and say well, we prefer the stability to supporting whose who are trying to overthrow him. remember that we were speaking to people on the revolutionary side that presented an articulate vision of what they could do. -- sodid not understand but wenot understand were not involved in libya for a long amount of time in the united states. strong,tervene, it was

based on a number of reasons. place inlanning took an atmosphere where we had limited imitation -- limited information. it sounds as though -- i think people were surprised. it isn't that we didn't allocate resources. did not want foreign , theyry aid on the ground did not want the special mission in libya. and that is what they got with bywho begin -- who began writing a paper on organizing the military structure. and it was only later when people in the western side realized the depth of the

fragmentation and that the revolution was unfinished. because success in libya proved incapable of the army for malicious. of militias. in having any western groups who frankly, i think would have been killed in the process to do so. >> retrospectively, one of the things that has occurred is the young leader of north korea, who was learned that if you give up your weapons of mass destruction then you likely will be taken out. and we are having to deal with the dynamic now. both for your testimony. of nationalnt accord, the proposed u.n. facilitated agreement has failed to achieve broad support in the country.

does that still represent the best way forward for libya, as you try to talk about all of the factions coming together? is that still an avenue? senator, i think the libyan political agreement remains a touchstone. most libyans would agree about that. according to the polls, a cd agreement signed -- they see the agreement signed as still being the agreement. you are talking about other bodies -- a state council. that's what is being worked out. there was a five person presidency council that was tremendously unwieldy and rife with division. so the talk now is how do you provide that? the sticking point has been elected civilian control over the military. the question is, are the new

negotiations a covert way for aneral haftar to come unto council where he would be the de facto ruler of the country? >> if that is a fundamental question, don't we have leverage? we give egypt and a norms amount of money. the saudi's are our allies. are we leveraging our relationship with those two vis a vie withe ar the support? he were both smiling. -- you are both smiling. thank you for that question. you hear that at confirmation hearings. deborah jones: we have many engagements in different areas in the region and the nature of our relationships with the

united arab emirates and turkey and others are tape and they are multilayered. and i think when it comes to priorities or how much leverage you actually have in some areas, it has quite limited. because what is existential for others isn't necessarily seen as that by us. so i think some of our friends have made a decision that they believe they live in the neighborhood and they cannot we naively think is a loving them to have access to money. there are ways around this. building and safeguards and transparent systems. as americans, you do have institutional ways around this in these settings, where institutions are not always the predominant feature. they see things differently.

>> so the bottom line is that you are saying that their interests will trump any influence that we may have over this? because we have a multilayered interest with them? would be aree that resigned to -- if we don't use leverage with countries that can anduence the situation continue to exasperate the circumstances as they exist -- aat we are destined to is continuing internal conflict, and striking crisis targets that we see as necessary. at that as long-term proposition for failure. i'm not sure if it is failure -- i think that's just the nature of u.s. international relations, it is a matter of priority when trying to influence others --

>> do you feel the same way? i do.hrey: i think the egyptians are coming around. they have actually push for negotiations between haftar and the west. libyaant the division of -- they don't want the division of libya. they have certain security interests. i think the new administration has more leverage. since we are sending these signals to certain goal states on iran,ave your back think it could translate into more leverage on libya. libya is a country whose still -- a country whose spillover impacts others. and in the case of the uae, i will call them out. their indifference -- their interference has been purely

ideological. this is the recipe for a country that will be immune to terrorism. need to have stronger leverage with the states. >> thank you. has certainly, from a security standpoint, been recently.th israel i too agree that there is leverage that we haven't had in the past that hopefully will be useful. >> thank you both for being here. let me ask a common question. he were both keen observers. -- you are both keen observers. i want to talk about the defense brigade. libya has become a safe haven. what are your views regarding cooperation between the benghazi brigade and al qaeda?

i know they have attempted to deny the links to terrorism, but is it not a fact that they are it will known coalition of islamic malicious and extremists? how would you characterize the b db? bdb at its core is formed by people who were ejected from benghazi. they came out and got support --m the city of mass product from the city of tripoli. at its core, hit his a symptom of the massive displacement from libya. many of them have families.

element -- look, this is a small country of 6 million. knowslamist leader will someone in al qaeda or he will be affiliated with al qaeda. are there people who had the al qaeda passed in the bdb? probably. is the involvement of unhelpful? yes. i don't think the libyan national army has the ability to it indefeat or challenge the royal crescent. it will be a site of contention for years. i would only add that there were many who argued that when haftar engaged in benghazi, he undid the work that had been done in parsing off the extremists around those

malicious and drove them back together because their sole objective became to defeat him. it is pairing off at the national grouping and marginalizing the extremists. queryain, as frederick yankees, theyke have somebody they would rather not have at the table. of the because he revolutionaries -- they are cousins or someone else. i would say that the hard-core al qaeda group is different. they have historically been a refuge because it is filled with caves and it is easily cut off. to hang outints is

there in the fifth century. it is a problem. benghazi is a mix. they drove out isil from benghazi. ,> on the broader question gaddafi was a really bad person but at least he kept the country stable. he was overthrown and now islamists are there and it has become a playground. i counter to the argument is that the islamists are not the people who overtook gaddafi. it was the libyan people. the choice before us at the time was not whether or not he stayed at whether a vacuum would follow. is my assessment of what happened in the revolution accurate? it is not being strictly did to syria and other parts of the world. effect of the

the fact of the matter is that the uprising that led to the ousting of gadhafi was not led by the radical elements as much it was under the libyan people that didn't want to live under this lunatic criminal. >> i think you're absolutely right, senator. but what happened was that immediately following the revolution it gets back to what we were saying before. the in fighting over control of the nation's assets have led to these divides that are not fundamentally ideological. at we, the infighting over control of the nation's assets have led to these divides that are not fundamentally ideological in nature. this is the country who 98% are sunnis. that's not the issue. the issue is who controls the wealth. that's why i say i see it as status quo, who owns the goods versus distributed democracy of people who felt it was time to share the wealth and also have a democratic group. i think there are some who are indeed, but they are still

democrats, small the democrats and those who are ideologues and extremists and they have always been there and they are dabbling in very troubled waters. at the end of the day, i still believe in my heart that this needs, a political reconciliation that provides for equitable distribution of national wealth in a transparent way will bring people together against those narrow groups of extremists. >> thank you, sir. let's go to this diplomatic breakthrough that the italians have made, bringing together the dna and the brook actions in some kind of preliminary

negotiation, to reach a negotiation with donald trump saying i don't want to have any part of getting the united states in the middle of this, but like you're saying, at the end of the day a diplomatic resolution is the only way we are going to be able to resolve these difficulties, including splitting up the oil revenues. can you talk a little bit about these initiatives and what hopes you may have for it to be a building block to have a resolution reached that is diplomatic and not military. >> i think the italians deserve enormous credit for brokering this. what it is is the state council ahead of the ho are

agreeing to talk, meeting for the first time, the question is, what's next. the devil is in the details. what new body emerges from this, but then i have to underscore this question about who controls military force. this was what led to the fighting back in 2014, the the monopoly on the use of force. the question will be what is the general's willingness to engage in this process as well. >> you think this indicates he is willing to participate in the process based on both factions will now be talking. >> i don't know. we've seen these things happen before, these initiatives and then there's always room for spoilers in libya. i just don't know what his stances. i know the algerians, the tunisians have their own initiative, i think it's encouraging that he is starting to meet with a number

of high-level officials, but as i understand it in the medications with the un, he wants a seat at the table that could be the head of the table. >> i was just going to say, talk is the opposite of conflict so that's a good thing, however the political balance of these negotiations is really flow thrown off when you have external elements making promises to people or giving them added weight in the equation that could then lead to them staying out of the process. i think that's the case right now and with other groups. >> so reports are that saroj is coming to the united states to meet with president trump and reports also are out there that they are going to talk to him before he comes to

washington to meet with trump. so, does i give you some reason to believe that the united states, president trump should play a hands-on role and not a hands-off role in terms of trying to resolve this dispute? >> of course, i think the president can play a helpful role in that if he underscores the importance of a political solution and authorities over the military. if anyone can make a deal, i think he probably thanks he can. >> you are saying this is an opportunity for president trump to try to make a deal. he should play a hands-on role in trying to bring these two parties together, if he is coming to see the president, i do believe the president

should offer something more than saying this is an italian problem and we will help you militarily and that's it. >> it's not simply the deal, but it's what comes next. it's that guarantees and the involvement to the make the deal stick. the sort of government approach is so important. we should be ready to engage. >> do you see this as a big moment, there's a number of events that are converging, heading toward this meeting in the white house. >> again, i don't want to sound pessimistic but i'm guardedly optimistic. it is something we have seen, this is where the regional state is so important. the role of the emirates and egypt, the fact that they agree to the 2015 agreement. meanwhile they hedged, the

role of regional spoilers and spoilers on the ground, can they deliver the rejection us in his camp. how much control does he have. >> thank you. thank you to both of you for being here today. i apologize if i'm asking a repetitive question. with the rising tension between house of representatives and the national court, there was a report from the guardian on march 14 that stated, russia appeared to have deployed special forces to an airbase in egypt near the border. it goes on to explain that u.s. and diplomatic officials have said any such russian involvement might be part of a support to the military commander. could you provide any input.

>> i'm going to yield because i have no information on that. >> i have no information beyond what i have read. >> if they were to do the open source report, what role do you think they should be playing. >> senator, i think, we know foreign special forces have played a role in the past in his campaign in benghazi, there's been russian offers of training in russia, there's been offers of medical help, i'm not sure what value adds that gets him right now. his principal mode of combat, he hasn't shown a willingness to go after so i think the question is is this another

arrow in the quiver of russia to signal their involvement. >> is it then in the national security interest of the united states, concern of our national security interests that there are special forces in libya. >> i think this is one of those where we have to be very cautious. we've had special forces. this is all a matter of common knowledge. i'm not giving anything away. i think it depends on what the intent is as the doctor said, what is their purpose, and i think a lot of it may be russia putting in our face that they are there. i think we have to be careful in how we respond to it. >> we've seen no increase or expand that flows out of libya.

>> concern? >> is there concern that russian forces or activity could spur migration again into russia, into greece or italy? >> i don't think so. most of those flows are coming up through the central area of the desert and the west. i don't think i would have any consequence for the flow of migrants at all. according to the 2017 posture statement, the instability in libya and north africa may be the significant near-term threat. could you talk about that statement could you talk about your concerns. >> i think the notion of libya is really profound so we were talking about a number of

interest in the region whether it's the success and stability of tunisia and we know they've plotted attacks on libyan soil. the security of the u.s. ally egypt. there is huge concern about the spillover of arms and jihadist to the south so i think libya is this epicenter that affects the surrounding region. >> can i add that i think it's important to remember that tripoli has a fairly normal day-to-day life on the scope, on the scale of things. what i am saying is a lot of the refugees are coming from other places and strolling through libya because is not governed properly. there is eternal displacement in libya but the wealthy libyans have other places to live. it's the planning and the smuggling of weapons that is

problematic. they will point out to you that they were not libyans, but that is the problem that libya provides a playing field in the south. on the other side of the coin, they don't provide the kind of urban centers that eiffe isil or -- exploit to as steel oil we've already seen libyans in the city state are prepared to fight, particularly in tripoli, they are not ready to allow that. >> thank you. i may have to step out. it may not be here at the end. i want to thank you both for being here and for your testimony. it's been very helpful. we look forward to following up again with questions "after words". with that, senator merkley. >> thank you, mr. chairman i

want to start by returning back to the conversation about the u.s. and the question of a no-fly zone. it seems like at some point we went beyond and in that transition, did we adequately, in terms of our analysis evaluate the consequences of that and understand the challenge that would be faced following the demise of gadhafi's regime? >> again, i wasn't part of the planning. i think the military would have to address that as well as people in the security council. however, i do believe we did not believe there was a vacuum

in the sense that we were speaking to people, some of them quite articulate supporters of the revolution who assured people they were prepared to come in and take over and provide the institutional replacement that would allow them to organize the country. i don't think libyans themselves were even aware of what a mess this would become, to be honest. >> i would agree. i think there was this overly optimistic assessment that libya would get back on their feet. a small country, oil reserves, it wasn't destroyed. i think there was this sense that we've handed this off to the europeans and united nation. now syria is happening. the libyan role is essential in the sense that they told us we got this. they didn't want a large presence on the ground. i think there was an excessive

focus on elections as a success marker that we've gotta get the election right. meanwhile there was a lot of lessons learned in terms of how we do this. i will also add the regional role. regional states have their own security plans. they had their own proxy and allies and they were doing things on the ground that were not helpful for unity later on. >> i do think it's something we should keep in mind later on. we have very articulate spokespersons in iraq who assured us there would be no challenge there in terms of the transition and those individuals will all always exists, but when there is a long-term dictator, if it's gadhafi or saddam hussein, the transition can be extraordinarily difficult "after words" and i feel like we should give that full analysis. i want to turn to the

nonproliferation side. following pan am 103 negotiations with libya, libya decides to try to rectify that. how to those conversations address the nuclear program that had said gadhafi, if he followed through to dismantle his nuclear program could gain a respected place among nations and touted this example as saying i hope others will find an example in libya's action. there were ten related sites that were addressed. at the time we were considering libya to miasma them what messages sent to iran and they were extremely dismissive that there was any reverberations in terms of how they would perceive the vulnerability following an agreement to dismantle his program.

i think that was tremendous to other countries we were working on. i just want to get your sense on that particular point. >> again, these are probably questions better directed to people like bill burns who were engaged in those negotiations back in the day. i would also say i think there is a sense at the time, and again i'm out of my lane, but there was a lot of discussion in the head of the first national council that led the government "after words" were they were talking and doing, looking at reforms and economic reforms and opening up in a certain way. i suspect there was an element

of hope. first there was a concern that it's never a good thing for the united states to not talk to large essentially placed countries that have it dangerous impact on the rest of the region. libya was at a point where we might see the openings of some sort of transition. obviously the libyan people didn't feel the same way when it came to 2011. >> the question i'm asking is in the context of the role that we and other nations play in dismantling the regime and the message that sent to north kore korea. >> i can probably speak more to the iranians because they probably have a better sense of government than the koreans

but they are adding their own survival success in that. i am not qualified to address that here. >> i would just add to that. i think it's a very different context. north korea and iran are totally different strategic context so i don't know what lessons they took from that. >> i find it a bit of a dodge at a time where we are trying to persuade other countries to dismantle their countries to not recognize that dismantling a nation i gave up their nuclear program would be seriously, others pay very serious attention to that so i don't really accept that you're not all qualified to address the question. i think you are ver being very tactful and polite. >> can i just say the u.s. dismantling the country, what was happening was there was a

failing government that was unable to meet the need of the government. the reform project was dead and you had an uprising. >> i didn't -- i referred to libya dismantling their nuclear program. >> but you are talking about the 2011, the result of that, he didn't have the ability to deter the intervention and that this led to his downfall. >> i'm really talking about the message of sent to have worked with the nation to have them forgo their nuclear program and then be vulnerable to outside intervention. that is kind of the core issue that drives north korea and iran to want to secure a nuclear weapon, to say, it kinda gives them a bit of a guarantee. our actions in regard to north korea would be different if they didn't have nuclear

weapons in existence. >> with all respect senator, i'm not trying to dodge, but i think a similar situation would only be if the north korean people themselves were rising up against the leader and being slaughtered. >> i have described it as a similar situation. >> i think that's changing the context. >> i think that makes it difficult to say because the united states and the international community choice, yes, maybe they're taking something from this. would gadhafi have used nuclear weapons on his own people? i'm not so sure. having participated in the final precursor for chemical weapons, i'm pretty glad we went in there and we were able to clean up a lot of that stuff because the last thing you want is to have it in the militias for the other groups. >> on that point, we do agree. thank you.

>> thank you. thank you to our panelists. i'm sorry i was at a hearing on north korea. i'm sorry to be late and missed your testimony. i wonder, could either of you speak to, and again, i apologize of some of these have been answered. can you speak to the current status of the government. my understanding is that while they haven't been able to govern very well, they do seem to have support from a lot of libyans. is that the case and how long would we expect that to continue if the current chaos extends for long period of time. i think again the support from libyans is for this agreement.

i was in libya last year end you sense it in the capital. there is, they are not able to meet people's basic needs. long lines in the banks, rolling electricity, blackouts, they haven't been able to get their budget under control. there is a dispute with the central bank. they don't control security. these militia flareups happen and their diving for cover. there is a sense that something needs to be new renegotiated but i think the foundational accord still sticks and i think a lot of libyans recognize that and you better not jump into the darkness msu got something to replace us. >> are you optimistic that there might be progress as a result of the discussion in rome and the potential, what appears to be maybe they're getting close to a compromise agreement? is that something that is promising that may offer hope for people?

>> i would agree with doctor wary that people don't want to throw out the baby with the bathwater and the fact that the international community and the united nations endorse this agreement and supported it, after a long time, it took a long time. in the process libyans learned a lot about political dialogue. it was a politically illiterate country in so many ways and having been part of that process for all those years, i saw this firsthand. i think they want to modify and extend. they would like to see, my sense is, and what i hear from libyans, they would like to see a final integration between the house of representatives with an authority that's not overly overwhelming. they don't want a strong authority. they don't want a dictator but they would like to see a unified authority and they would like to see general hester under the civilian authority.

or, even marginalized. quite frankly, a lot of people would like to see him in some honorary role on the outside, promoted up and out, but libyans want stability. they want predictability, and they want their economy to grow again. that's what they really want. >> what about the discussions in rome. are they really making progress? >> i'm not privy to a lot of the details, i think discussion is already better than the opposite, but we have seen a lot of discussions in the past. libyans are very good at talking and throwing chaff and going back and fragmenting even more so you come back with a whole new ballgame, but i think at least it's a step in the italians do know libya very, very well and libyans i have spoken to do believe the italians are taking the correct approach. i will say that. >> how concerned are you that the united states seems to be missing from the discussions? and from a leadership role

right now on what's going on. >> very, and, what does that mean as you talked about the economy of libya and how people want to see the economy going again, and as the beginning to get their oil reserves producing again, and we are looking at other nations coming in, russia, i assume china to come in and provide assistance to the oil reserves, what does that mean for the united states in the future? >> i will say only that if the perception becomes and spreads that the only time the united states was interested in post revolutionary libya was when we could make a lot of deals and money and the minute we became difficult we pulled out and focused on military instead of what we believe as americans as the for freedom

principles, then we have a problem. >> you would both like to see the united states take more of a leadership role? >> i think we need to be present and we need to make clear what our vision is. i think we have very successfully, libya was one of these for situations, certainly in my 30 for your career where was a bilateral assignment as ambassador but it was a multilateral process throughout where we were supporting un positions and also having to work and coordinate very closely with security cancel representatives and allies. we had to deal with regional powers and parties. libya has many parties in it. the u.s. needs to play a signature role and a very important symbolic role certainly, and it needs to be, presence matters.

>> you agree with that? >> completely. that was a great characterization. it's not us leading the charge on this, but playing a cordoning function and we are sort of the glue that keeps it together with these different players. just being present at the table is so essential. echoing from my conversations on the ground, this notion that we are there for counterterrorism, or we are there for the oil, these narratives are out there so these notions that we care about the libyan people and we care about people are so important. >> i know i'm over my time, but in terms of the future of africa, north africa and middle east, don't we have to

include libya with whatever strategy we decide with this region. >> yes, libya, many of the states have the potential to be a resource and really an important boundary for a lot of africa. it should be a major tourist area. it should be a major medical center. it should be a place of university. it has a history, it has a presence, it has a place and it's really close. i tell people it's closer to rome than mecca. libya is closer to some parts of italy then some of its neighbors. it is important. it cannot be dismissed. >> thank you.

thank you, mr. chairman. let me just ask one or two questions if i may. the commander of the u.s. africa command general, before the armed services committee warned that libya must carefully choose where and with whom we work in order to counter isis and not shift the balance sparking greater conflict in libya. what lessons did we learn from the campaign last year. [inaudible] >> i will say it was our policy prescription back in march 2015 that the only way we could defeat a soul was to partner across the board

because of the landmass of libya. we can't choose one partner. at the time, the chairman agreed that anyone who shared our views on isis could be a partner in libya to deny them any toehold. you have to partner with like-minded or people who share your view. we worked and we found them, so that has been successful in that regard. i would just add to that that those who drove out the islamic state were tied to the government of national cord, but just very loosely. some of them were opposed to it. they have now turned on the government. again, we did form a partnership, but it was a very limited and targeted where we

assisted them on a geographic threat. we are not talking about training militias, writing them a blank check or giving them aid because that could upset the balance amount was mentioned in the testimony, if we side with one faction against terrorism, that could cause the other faction to go against us to return to a regional patron. there is all sorts of second and third order effects. we've seen it in the east were certain countries were giving support to the lma which was an unrecognized forest and i had a political effect on negotiations. >> if the head of the president's counsel actually comes to washington, if that were to take place, there are some rumors, i want to follow up on charming quarters follow-up to my question. what should the united states expect in deliverables from the leaders of the president

counsel if they were to come to the united states as a prerequisite for a visit year in america. >> i was going to turn around and say my advice would be that he needs to come prepared to firmly articulate what he is prepared, what he needs, but also what he can do right now, what the situation is and what he's prepared to do as well in terms of compromise or political dealmaking to bring things to closure. so often we found that when the libyans come, they are kind of looking for someone else to tell them what to do and then they want to quibble with it. they can't do this with a can't do that. he needs to come with a clear, articulate vision of where he sees the process going. he should be prepared to play

out what the italian dialogue is producing, and he should be prepared to put out there what their minimum standards are for any kind of compromise or for expanding and also revising the agreement. the u.s. shouldn't be put in a position of having to offer something larger, but he should be able to articulate what it is he wants to do. >> so he should come with a specific game plan. is there something more we could expect from that type of a high visible opportunity? >> unfortunately i don't think he's in the position of strength to deliver. it has to be, this visit happened within a broad consensus that includes other players. it's not just the visit alone. he may ask for a million things. but they go back and they can execute and they can't write

the check. we've seen this movie before. we need to demand when he comes, who is on board and what's the consensus and what's the roadma roadmap. >> thank you. this has been very informative. we appreciate your insight and hope to have more visits to create opportunities. we thank you both for sharing your deep knowledge of the situation. we will keep record open until the close of business on thursday. i know both of you have busy lives but if you can respond to questions promptly, we appreciate it. we look forward to seeing you back here in the near future and thank you very much for your testimony. the meeting is adjourned.

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